Abstract: This paper interprets Hoene Wronski's (1776-1853) use of actual infinities in his mathematical work. The interpretation places this usage, which undermined Wronski's acceptance as mathematician, in his contemporary mathematical and philosophical context, and in the context of his own socio-political-philosophical project.
Since information about Wronski is not widely available, I include a brief biography in Appendix A and a brief summary of Wronski's mathematics in Appendix B. Those who do not know Wronski are advised to read these appendices first. Wronski's philosophy is surveyed comprehensively in Warrain (1933-38) and d'Arcy (1970) , and summarily in Murawski (2006) . I do not provide a general summary here, but some elements of this philosophy will surface as the paper unfolds.
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 2 we will review two uses of actual infinity by Wronski. We will claim that Wronski makes bolder endorsement of actual infinities and place them in more foundational positions than do most of his contemporaries (most notably, his direct audience of the Parisian Academy of Science). In section 3 we will give the Kantian background to Wronski's philosophy, and show its limits in accounting for Wronski's use of infinities. In section 4
we'll frame Wronski's position with respect to his socio-political environment and to post Kantian thinking. This framing will articulate the philosophical/political problem that Wronski tries to resolve, and explain why existing philosophies of mathematics were not sufficient for the task. In sections 5 and 6 we will explain Wronski's own architecture of mathematical infinities. In section 7
we will motivate this organization of mathematical ideas by placing them within a more general political and philosophical context.
Wronski's use of actual infnities
Here are two examples for Wronski's "outrageous" use of actual infinity.
In his first major publication, the Introduction à la Philosophie des Mathématiques , 4 Wronski introduces the logarithm as the function that satisfies the equation:
  The beginning of this maneuver is not new. In fact, it is taken (as Wronski explicitly acknowledges) from Halley (1695) . It is also similar to the maneuvers applied by the main figure of 18 th century mathematics: Leonhard Euler (1988 [1748 , 93 ff; analyzed in Jahnke 2003, 115) . But, as we'll see below, this traditional maneuver was not welcome among many of Wronski's addressees: the Parisian academy, supporters of Lagrange's algebraic analysis and those involved in the attempts to suppress infinitesimals at the polytechnic. Wronski was obviously aware of the objections that could be raised to his use of actual infinity, and anticipated them in a footnote that promised to deal with them "rigorously" elsewhere (the best reference would be his 1814 Philosophie de l'Infini).
But the element which is most "reactionary" here is the final definition of e. In the part borrowed from Haley, the use of infinity takes an argument involving finite magnitudes to an extreme. It fits into a culture where infinity was a somewhat volatile entity to be handled with care, or perhaps even a useful fiction, to be controlled by the pragmatics of consistency and of computational and empirical verification (see Ferraro 2004) . One could go through infinity to obtain finite result, or use it to simplify complicated expression (e.g. the binomial expansion above) in succinct terms (the definition of the logarithm above). But when it comes to Wronski's definition of e, infinity is cast in a founding, rather than accessory role. In Wronski's own words, this definition is "the primitive theoretical expression, the idea or primary conception of the number called the base of the natural logarithms" (INT 14) . It is not just one useful identity among others, as it was for Wronski's predecessors; it is the fundamental defining expression of this quantity. As we shall see, this is precisely the role that Wronski assigns to actual infinity.
In the next example , Wronski goes considerably farther in his use of actual infinities.
Here the task is to expand the function 1 This move can be understood as analogous (in its intention, if not in the consistency of its end result) to the introduction of multiple and imaginary roots in order to decompose real polynomials into as many factors as their degree, and to the introduction of the imaginary point at infinity in projective geometry so as to homogenize claims concerning parallel and non-parallel lines.
However, unlike in the case of (1), the use of infinities here is not grounded in common 18 th century practice, and would appear far more suspicious to almost everyone involved in the mathematical scene.
5 On top of the obvious objections that would arise here concerning the determination and use of actual infinities, there's another problem that Wronski misses: given this representation, the expression for -x -m ends up independent of m! This shows that Wronski's algebraic manipulations were not always properly thought through. My point, however, is not to evaluate the end result, but explain the motivation that led Wronski to go there.
This point should be qualified carefully, because experts who saw drafts of this paper reacted in ways that ranged from claiming that actual infinities had already been in common use to stating that they were hardly ever endorsed -and they were all correct. His unorthodox approach does not mean that Wronski was a quack. He did make many mistakes and many over-generalized, extravagant claims (even more than was typical among his often overgeneralizing and extravagant contemporaries), but he was at the same time an able mathematician who advanced some original contributions. Moreover, Wronski does acknowledge that formulas such as (3) may "perhaps never present any use in the application of the science, but they're important for the science itself, and especially for its philosophy" (TECI, (77) (78) . Here the philosophical point is the general equivalence that, as we shall discuss below, "should take place", according to Wronski's conceptions, between infinite products and infinite series in the representation of functions: since 1  m x has a power series representation, it should also have an infinite product representation, and these representations should be interchangeable according to general rules.
We see that Wronski used infinity in a way that had roots in the practice and ideas of his predecessors, but he also went beyond these common practices and reorganized these ideas in a way that would antagonize the very people he sought to impress. Moreover, he insisted on his use of infinities, even against criticism that practically ruined him. This puzzling state of affairs defines my task for the rest of this paper: try and explain the political and philosophical motivation for Wronski's insistence on his aberrant use of infinities.
Wronski as a Kantian
In order to understand Wronski's approach, let's start from his commentary on the formula for the logarithm (1). Wronski explains that functions like the logarithm are such that their "NATURE (and not only VALUE) can be constructed only through a progressive generation, more and more exact, but rigorously indefinite, that is by a generation that is at the same time finite at every step and indefinite as a whole" (REFII, 298).
This echoes Wronski's earliest work on mathematics, the Philosophie ou Législature des Mathématiques (LEG), begun at the summer of 1804 and published posthumously. This work presents a philosophical categorization of various kinds of magnitudes, culminating in a reformulation of one of Kant's antinomies of pure reason: the contradiction between the apparently well founded claims that the universe is infinite and that it is bounded in time and space. LEG is Wronski's most Kantian work, and since he saw his work as a continuation of Kant's, this is a good place to start our analysis.
Wronski's analysis is based on a distinction between the Kantian faculties of understanding and reason. In Wronski's terms, reason generates concepts, while the understanding uses these concepts to impose an organized unity on our objective intuitions or empirical experiences. Based on this division of intellectual labor, some magnitudes, to be named "intellectual", can be contained by the understanding, while others, to be termed "ideal," cannot (LEG 114). 6 According to this definition, discrete finite quantities (integers and rational numbers) belong under the term "intellectual", as they are used for putting together our concrete intuitions and empirical experiences. But when we advance to irrational quantities, imaginary numbers and infinities, we also go beyond our discretely articulated empirical experiences, and so exceed the realm of the understanding.
But Wronski does not clump all ideal magnitudes together. He further divides them into "intellectually generated," namely those whose process of generation can be contained by the understanding, as opposed to "ideally generated" ). An ideal magnitude that is intellectually generated is ideal as a given magnitude, but its process of generation is accessible to the understanding . This is precisely the situation of the logarithm according to the above analysis: when considering the binomial expansion above, each step in its generation (each term in the series) is finite and containable by the understanding, but its ideal final result (an irrational quantity) is a product of reason. The same applies to other irrational quantities. In contrast, ideally generated ideal magnitudes are magnitudes that cannot be generated by an indefinite accumulation of finite magnitudes, namely, imaginary numbers and actual infinities, which have no power series approximations. These latter magnitudes are pure creations of reason in their generation as well as in their end result.
This account links a traditional distinction between magnitudes with the new, Kantian, system of faculties. A specification of the structure of this system is provided in What we have here is a transcendent concept of infinity in reason, an immanent concept of the finite in the understanding, and a regulative application of the infinite-turned-indefinite, applied by an act of judgment, in order to make sense of our intuition of the world. All this is quite in line with the Kantian solution to the antinomy concerning the in/finity of the universe. According to this solution,
we have no experience of a complete, infinite universe, only of concrete finite pieces. But our thinking is also subject to the postulate that any step toward the end of the universe can be followed by another, and that any reason in the chain that leads to the origin of the universe should have another reason behind it. These regulative postulates put together our finite experiences into a unified indefinite scheme. This indefiniteness of the universe solves Kant's antinomy and provides the initial scaffolding for Wronski's infinities.
But if we ended our description of Wronski's philosophy here, we would provide a very partial and biased account. The middle ground of "indefiniteness" or "potential infinity" was a popular means of approaching the problem of infinity at least since Aristotle, and was enough to account for most uses of infinity in applied mathematics, which could be rearticulated as limits in the intuitive sense of Newton and d'Alembert. But not all of Wronski's infinities (or those of his predecessors and contemporaries) were reducible to indefinite approximation. Indeed, (3) uses actual infinities, which are not mediated by any form of indefiniteness or approximation, and may therefore appear cut off from any being in the world and from the mathematics that is concerned with such being. D'Alembert's philosophical framework was more oriented toward reflection than language. Reason was to constitute a distinct faculty involved in the study of nature. Indeed, "although no calculation 9 Note that for Wronski an indefinitely increasing or decreasing sequence does not approximate the infinitely large or infinitely small respectively. The former is clear, because the difference between any term in an increasing sequence and the infinitely large is infinite. The latter case is less obvious for us, because we think of the difference between terms of a decreasing sequence and their limit at zero. But Wronski (like his contemporaries) thought in terms of the ratio between decreasing finite terms and the infinitely small (which is not a zero!), and this ratio remains infinite.
proper is possible except by numbers, nor any magnitude measurable except by extension …, we arrive through the continual generalization of our ideas at the principal part of mathematics". But along with this abstract generalization, mathematics "retraces its steps, reconstitutes anew its perceptions themselves, and, little by little and by degrees, produces from them the concrete beings that are the immediate and direct objects of our sensations". (d'Alembert 1995, 20-21) . We see that, for d'Alembert, while experience must be complemented by reason, the work of reason must be retraceable, in turn, to empirical experience (Daston 1979 ).
This anchoring of reason to experience was a philosophical principle that protected the liberal thinkers of the enlightenment from submission to the absolute authority of the ancien regime. Hobbes against Wallis and of Berkeley against Newton. Both Hobbes and Berkeley rejected infinitesimals based on a sensualist ontology (if it can't be sensed, it needn't be considered part of reality). But to complement this meager ontology and enable social order, they required, respectively, consent or revelation, which in turn established absolute sovereign authority. Indeed, Berkeley's The Analyst opens with an explicit controversy over authority (Ewald 1996, 62) .
For a detailed study of the politics of infinitesimals in the 17th century see Alexander (2014) .
infinitesimals, and revolutionary positions. and "illiberals" (who take upon faith the transcendent principles exposed by the Christian revelation and submit themselves unquestioningly to clergy and absolute sovereign authority). This is, of course, Wronski's very schematic view of the political divide, which is not an objective description.
As a loose approximation, however, it is not entirely unfounded. Typically, the champions of enlightenment (even while using infinitesimals) tended to use them as convenient shortcuts, whereas resorting to actual infinities as foundations tended to carry with it absolutist overtones. As we shall see, Wronski's motivation for his oversimplification of political divisions was to place himself in the position of a unifying mediator.
Choosing to set actual infinity as a foundational element places Wronski, at least in terms of his own analysis, in opposition to the republican establishment and in coalition with the restoration of infinitesimals and with other restorative trends. This choice is motivated by the fact that France of the revolution and enlightenment was dominated by those he saw as "liberals". As a countermeasure, this domination had to be balanced by a bold revindication of infinitesimals. Only the sound affirmation of actual, constitutive infinity would counter the prevalence of the Fries' Kantian approach appears clearly in such statements as "the infinite is the indefinite, and an infinite greatness or smallness can never be considered as a given totality" (Fries 1822, 258) Fries' "formalist" approach to infinities, on the other hand, distinguishes between syntactic operations (combinations of signs that follow arbitrary rules) and arithmetic operations (operations that deal with magnitudes and follow their inherent Kantian axioms). The former depends on order, and the latter on measure, and so the syntactic approach is independent of the arithmetic one (Fries 1822, 68) . Operations with infinities and infinitesimals are strictly syntactic (Fries 1822, 280, 294) , so infinite series generally have only a syntactic meaning, except where they converge arithmetically. Fries explicitly associated the syntactic approach with Hindenburg's combinatorial school. This school was not popular in France, but it had its presence there through such figures as Kramp and Arbogast and even Lagrange's earlier work (1774), which had helped to inspire it. Fries further associated the syntactic approach with the creative imagination, which for him belonged to reason (Jahnke 1990, 229; 1993, 268) .
At first sight, Wronski, who was strongly influenced by both Kant and the combinatorial school, might be expected to have affirmed ideas similar to those of Fries. 11 However, the Kantian indefinite was too closely associated with the mathematics of limits (and therefore with D'Alembert and the enlightenment's anchoring of reason to the understanding) for Wronski to endorse it as foundational. The syntactic approach, on the other hand, was a nominalist-formalist approach that all but cut the cord between reason and understanding; related notions such as "useful fiction" or "arbitrary signs" reeked of such enlightened philosophers as Condillac and Condorcet, and left reason with no constitutive role.
Neither of the above paths was sufficiently opposed to the French Academy of Sciences, and neither accentuated enough the cleavage between liberal immanent finitists and illiberal transcendent infinitists, for Wronski to accept them as foundational. Indeed, Wronski's project of articulating, and then resolving, the gap between liberal/illiberal or immanent/transcendent or finite/infinite required an infinity that was more than an indefinite or a syntactic element. It required, first, an infinity that could stand in clear opposition to enlightened conceptions of magnitude, and, second, the means to reconcile this infinity with the rationalist-sensualist approach associated with Wronski's "liberals".
Beyond Kant's Infinity
Already in 1804 Wronski wrote of Kant that he "stopped at the RELATIVE, and did not ascend as far as the ABSOLUTE infinity" (LEG 123; here, "relative" and "absolute" infinities being the above "intellectually generated" and "ideally generated" ideal magnitudes respectively). Indeed, Kant proposed a transcendental solution to the antinomy of reason: since the understanding can only contain intellectually generated, relative infinities, the role of reason is reduced to a regulative role, that of ruling over the indefinite formation of intellectually generated, relative infinities. But the constitutive role of reason, establishing an actual, absolute infinity -Kant set aside.
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According to Wronski, this was no accident. Wronski believed that reason necessarily hides its role as constitutive of absolute infinities (Wronski uses here the French term "subreption"). Indeed, once reason constituted absolute infinity, this general notion shouldn't contain anything that's not also containable in one of its concrete manifestations, that is, in some relative infinity (this assumption is an important component of Wronski's philosophy, as we shall see in section 7 below). But then, once contained in some relative infinity, it becomes accessible to the understanding in such a way that reason reveals itself in a merely regulative role . So reason never presents itself to the understanding as constitutive, and in every encounter with the understanding the infinite is necessarily reduced to an indefinite.
But despite this appearing-disappearing act of reason, the existence of an absolute, actual infinity 13 12 Wronski did recognize that the transcendent level, where the absolute subsists, is available in Kant, but laments that it is only to be found in his critique of practical reason, rather than that of pure reason (Prod 58 fn.). 13 Since the above analysis only shows that absolute infinity would necessarily be hidden if it actually existed, Wronski is the cornerstone of Wronski's philosophy in general and his philosophy of mathematics in particular. Indeed, in discussing mathematical infinite powers, for example, Wronski says that they are "possible only by the application of reason to functions of the understanding … and are therefore transcendent functions, or conceptions of reason, ideas proposed by this supreme intellectual faculty" (INT 12; cf. REFI 345-346 for other transcendent infinities). Note that Wronski is talking here about transcendence (that which is independent of experience) rather than the transcendental (that which regulatively conditions experience). Wronski's infinities go beyond the transcendental and the indefinite.
As we saw, an intellectually generated infinity is one that would be contained in the understanding by an indefinite process of approximation, while an ideally generated infinity could not be contained
by the understanding at all. This means that such an infinity does exist, but is completely invisible to the understanding. How is this expressed in actual mathematical experience? Wronski's answer is that an actual infinitely small magnitude would be seen as zero by the understanding. This is why two quantities differing by an actual infinitesimal, which are genuinely different from the point of view of reason, must be regarded as rigorously equal from the point of view of the understanding, that is, in empirical experience. Here is how Wronski puts it:
[T]he laws of infinitesimal calculus are purely subjective, that is, they are only rules for the More succinctly put, "WITHIN THE CONDITIONS OF TIME, one could NEVER attain [an] indefinitely small difference" (INF 20) .
provides an independent proof of its existence and our ability to grasp it, which won't be discussed here. Very briefly, Wronski derives this from our very doubt in our ability to grasp infinity -only if we have some understanding of what it is, could we have grounds for doubting our ability to grasp it.
In the above quotation there are two levels of articulation: subjective and objective. In Wronski's jargon "subjective" designates that which pertains to knowledge, but not necessarily to an individual knower. We see that this subjective level is "generative": it creates our conception of quantities by means of the infinitely small. The objective level relates to the world of phenomena. At this level, the infinitely small can only be rendered as zero. The infinitely small, which exists only at the former level, and cannot be approximated or represented in the latter, is therefore transcendent. It can give rise to indefinite approximations (e.g., of an irrational number by a power series of rational terms), but is never given or approximated as such.
14 In his polemic against Carnot concerning the foundations of the calculus, Wronski asserted that Carnot's attempt to ground infinitesimal calculus algebraically, in terms of independent variables rather than infinitesimals, was logically flawed due to a vicious circle (reconstructed in Guerraggio and Panza 1985), which was covered over by the alleged reduction of calculus to Carnot's purely analytic principle: "two non-arbitrary quantities cannot differ except by a non-arbitrary quantity"
(INF 22; "non-arbitrary" means here determined quantities without "arbitrarily small" or other variable components; the term "analytic" is used here in its Kantian sense: an a-priori logical truth, derivable from the concepts of the relevant terms). But Wronski objected that a purely analytic principle cannot expand our mathematical knowledge beyond the realm of understanding, which contains only rational numbers. To use Kantian language, mathematics includes a synthetic element (an element that cannot be derived from mere definitions and logical laws), and therefore depends on the constructive introduction of an element foreign to the understanding. Carnot's theory, as well as any other theory that is reducible to finite, rational quantities, lacks such an element.
Wronski's alternative founding principle (which is borrowed from Euler, but is given a new philosophical meaning) states that two quantities differing by an infinitesimal are really equal. This principle is properly generative: it carries over from reason something foreign to the realm of the understanding (INF 24), and this foreignness can account for the mathematical leap of knowledge beyond the understanding's world of straight lines and rational numbers, a leap inherent in the infinitesimal calculus. This is why, for Wronski, the metaphysical account of the foundation of calculus by the actual infinities of reason is superior to all other accounts: no other account explains how mathematics can exceed the realm of finite rational quantities available to the understanding 14 The fact that a sequence approximates a number does not mean that their difference approximates an infinitely small magnitude; see footnote 9 above.
(recall that for Wronski, even the incommensurability of the side and the diagonal of a square requires an infinitary reasoning, as well as the continuous variation of any curve that is not a straight line, as they are not accessible to discrete observation).
According to Wronski, the manifestation of the generative power of infinity is explicit in infinite expansions, such as Taylor 
. Using the definition of the logarithm from (1) above, one gets
Wronski then develops the two binomials according to the standard binomial formula, and, neglecting higher infinitesimals to form the identity
on the other hand, is the best representation of π by the understanding: an indefinite series that can be used to approximate π using only addition and subtraction. These two formulas represent the two levels of mathematical cognition, and demonstrate how they are related.
A more idiosyncratic use of actual infinities that derives from Wronski's philosophy concerns an This operation of factorial is extended to non integer values of n by means of power series representations and extension of algebraic identities. In turn, these power series and identities lead to such paradoxes as
Which are clearly false. This led Kramp to cast doubts on some established identities and techniques. Wronski's solution was to go back to the infinitary generation of the relevant quantities (namely, the expressions that Wronski takes, following Kramp's manipulations and his own foundational hierarchy, to be their "philosophical" definitions, which, like (4) above represent their generation in reason), according to which (-a) n is a product of infinitely many terms of the form
According to Wronski's analysis, building on that of Kramp, the left (complex) term of this product does not appear in the decomposition of (-a) n|-r into an infinite product. The missing infinitesimal complex term is supposedly the reason that the identity a r | n n r | n a = a 1 does not extend to negative a and r. Therefore, this infinitary-generative analysis circumvents the ensuing contradiction (I do not enter into details, because Wronski's analysis is inconsistent; but for the purpose of explaining Wronski's ideology, his wrong analyses are as good as his correct ones).
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The point of this example is to show how the transcendent, infinitary, generative level reveals ideal elements that are hidden at the immanent level, and can serve to explain what appears paradoxical from the point of view of the understanding.
Universalizing transcendent and immanent magnitudes by acts of will
To further understand the relations between transcendent infinities and immanent mathematical practice, let's consider Wronski's distinction between theory and techne:
The Theory of Algorithmics [Wronski's preferred term for analysis] has as its object the nature or the construction of … quantities. -The theory is a speculation where the understanding in general dominates: its object … consists of that which is in the essence or construction of algorithmic quantities.
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The Techne is a sort of action where the will dominates: its object … consists in that which should be done to arrive at the evaluation of algorithmic quantities. … While the different quantities produced by the Theory of 
It seems that Wronski is concerned here with how the concepts of magnitudes are contained in the understanding (that is as concepts, not as the magnitudes themselves); otherwise ideal magnitudes would simply be foreign to the understanding. exponents, trigonometric functions, additive and multiplicative differences and differentials, congruences and equations] nothing hinders the concept of generating the same quantities by means of other algorithms than those which give them their primitive determination, namely [infinite series]. But this secondary generation of algorithmic quantities, foreign to the primitive generation given by the algorithms forming the Theory of Algorithmics, cannot be a product of the understanding, which is precisely the faculty of the above named primitive generation. … The secondary generation … can only be a product of the will, an end or a goal ; see also TECI 17-18, REFI 56).
This relation between theory and techne or understanding and will is manifest in equations (4) and (5).
In (4) we are presented with the theoretic nature of π: a finite combination of infinite magnitudes and higher arithmetical operations (such as powers). In (5) we have the evaluation of π, namely its elementary construction by an indefinite combination of finite magnitudes and the most basic arithmetic operations (addition and subtraction). The point is precisely to bridge the gap between the two levels: the understanding's finite manipulation of given theoretical elements (which may include elements not containable by the understanding as quantities, such as infinite magnitudes) and the will's technical power of indefinite construction.
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To understand the concept of "will" above, we should look at its more general definition. The will is not only the faculty that transforms finite combinations of mathematical elements (or theoretical expressions, like (4)) into indefinite summations (or technical expression, like (5)). The will is in charge of any passage from individual to universal: Individuality manifests itself immediately in the effective existence of objects …, whereas their universality is only a necessary postulate of the very possibility of that existence. From that follows that the former, individuality, forms an immediate object of our cognition, and that the latter, universality, can only become an object of our cognition mediately, by means of first 17 There's a change of point of view here in Wronski's own work, which may be confusing. If we look at the quantities themselves, then (4) involves ideal quantities generated by reason, whereas (5) involves only finite quantities and summations. From this point of view, (5) is a simpler expression. But from the point of view of putting together the concepts, without looking into their content, (4) is a finite combination, which is therefore accessible to the understanding, while (5) is an indefinite combination, which the understanding can never contain in its entirety. So from this point of view, (4) turns out to be simpler. becoming a goal or an end of speculation, that is an object of our will (REFI 46-47).
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In other words, to exist in knowledge (the subjective level) means to exist under some universal. To exist in the world (objectively) means to exist as an individual. Putting together individuals under universals is not something given, but the constructive project of knowledge, and the faculty which implements this project is called the will. In mathematics, the ability to express all mathematical functions in terms of series would unite the various individual quantities under a universal form. This is precisely the project that Wronski terms "techne": providing general means for producing power series and infinite product representation for all mathematical quantities.
Given this formulation, it makes sense to place mathematics in the grand schematic articulation of philosophical knowledge under the title "Accomplishment of Nature" (REFI 530) , that is, the project of doing what's necessary to bring elementary, immediate given beings to their full development in universal knowledge. Mathematics in general, and its techne in particular, is the task of creating a universal systematization of magnitudes, whereby reason forms being through acts of will.
In Wronski's system, the absolute infinity of reason is not just the Kantian tool that regulates our understanding, but a constative product that relegates to our will the task of applying it so as to unify and reform our world. Reason's infinity generates magnitudes that the understanding can handle as given concepts (even if it can't approximate them as quantities), and then charges the mathematician's will with the task of systematizing the resulting conceptual reality in terms accessible to finite empirical intuition.
The use of actual infinities in decomposing a function into an indefinite product of linear terms, as in (3), or an indefinite sum, as in (5), may initially appear as an arbitrary game of signs; in fact, however, this is the fulfillment of the will's task of turning distinct magnitudes into a universal system, where all functions can be expressed as infinite products of linear terms and infinite sums of 18 This notion of will seems to be Kantian (standing with respect to theoretical understanding as practical reason stands with respect to pure reason), rather than influenced by Kant's later followers, for whom the concept of will tends to associate with autonomy and self determination rather than with universal laws. Wronski's early usage of "will" is too early to be influenced by Schopenhauer, but we can't rule out influence by Fichte, Schelling or Hegel. This influence clearly grows in Wronski's later writings.
powers. The will actively constructs such secondary (indefinite additive or multiplicative) descriptions of those magnitudes generated by reason, which finite understanding was able to handle as combinations of given concepts, but was too poor to systematize and approximate without external intervention.
Representing functions as series was a common feature of much of 18 th century mathematics.
Wronski gives this project a philosophical motivation in terms of the various faculties of cognition and the task of organizing knowledge under universals. Due to this motivation, Wronski sought to bring all series representation techniques known at the time under a single form: his so called "universal law" (see Appendix B).
But to meet this challenge of universalization, the will must not be subject to the limitations of finite calculations: universality is more important than convergence. Therefore, Wronski first affirms that both convergent and divergent series are acceptable. Indeed, given a function F, the coefficients of its Taylor series  
(as well as its generalizations studied by Wronski) can be determined by such iterative processes as:
where dx are infinitesimals. The coefficients of the series are assumed to fully characterize the function F, because it is evident that no other function "can produce the same sequence of quantities A 0 ,A 1 ,A 2 , etc.", and therefore regardless of whether it is "convergent or divergent, this series always presents, in the law of the generation of the coefficients …, a rigorous and complete determination of the quantity F(x) . 19 According to this view, even in cases where, as in (3), coefficients turn out to be infinite, they still represent the given function, and may be related to finite convergent sums (see also Wagner 2012).
19 While today this claim is considered false, it was held true by Lagrange (1797, 37 ) (who qualifies it as cast in doubt by "some geometers" who remain unnamed). Even after Cauchy's famous example of exp(-1/x 2 ), which generates the same Taylor coefficients as 0 when expanded around 0, some mathematicians remained unconvinced. Poisson rejected the claim by allowing the order of the derivative to increase as x decreases (Grattan-Guinness 1990, 735-736); Martin
Ohm rejected it because the derivatives at zero were not well defined in the complex plain; and Pringsheim and du BoisReymond later explained why, in the framework of 18 th century algebraic analysis, the derivatives at zero of this function
were not well defined, and, therefore, Cauchy's example did not work (Jahnke 1990, 302-306) .
Problems arise, however, if we start from a series, and try to go back to the function. If the series does not converge, then "the hypothetic function Fx, corresponding to the general value of the series, will not exist effectively unless [it is transformed into a series] that could be convergent".
Therefore "a series formed arbitrarily does not always have a general value Fx corresponding to all values of the variable x" (TEC II 294-295). Indeed, the two volumes of TEC devote hundreds of pages to transforming divergent series into convergent ones and to extending domains of convergence. These transformations include change of variables, the use of weighted partial sums of coefficients (in modern terms: convolutions), various decompositions and continued fractions.
This approach shows how wrong it is to view Wronski as some sort of mindless formalist, even when he allows himself to play around with quantity concepts that the understanding cannot even gradually approximate. Wronski's work is always about the connection between extravagant infinitary maneuvers and a concern for the level of bottom line calculation. His claims are often too general, and his techniques do not always guarantee the convergence that they purport to bring, but he still considers convergence to be an important concern. For Wronski, mathematical techne is all about willing a connection -a connection which is not given in advance -between a constative infinity and finite worldly experience. Where will fails in this task, our knowledge is either false or not completely formed. Wronski's system does not use infinites "opportunistically" to obtain empirically relevant results; it is rather founded on infinities, and seeks to reform the world by reorganizing it under their generative foundation.
In fact, this vision is not limited to mathematics. The creative aspect of reason is applicable to the entire philosophical project:
[T]he true definition of philosophy, unknown to this day, consists in that the object of philosophy is the CREATION OF THE TRUTH, and not, as is still believed universally today, the KNOWLEDGE OF created TRUTHS, knowledge which is properly only the special object of the sciences (REFI 517; see also Warrain 1933, vol. 1, 91-92) .
Wronski in context, Part II
Now that we've placed Wronski's infinity in the context of his mathematical project, it's time to zoom out to a wider ideological context. Indeed, Wronski repeatedly explains that his mathematical work is subordinate to his general philosophical goal, and that the point of the former is merely to prefigure the fruitfulness and validity of the latter. In the "final identity" above, "I" is created man and "Non-I" the creator God (the use of I and non-I here and below is explicitly linked to Fichte). What illiberals miss is the creative power of man's reason, whose discovery is independent of (Christian) revelation of an infinite absolute. Wronski wants to bring illiberals to acknowledge and synthesize their own rational creative power so as to advance the process of man's becoming immortal and one with God. 20 The creative, universalizing project of the will described in section 6 is a means to this goal. Mathematics provides a pristine example of how man can apply constitutive infinitary reason and create a unified world. Such an example, Wronski hoped, would convince illiberals in the promise of Wronski's larger philosophical project.
In the "primitive identity" above, "I" is subjective knowledge and "Non-I" objective reality. What liberals miss is the fact that constructs of reason are not only in reason, but are actual realities.
Wronski wants to bring liberals to deduce the necessary existence of that which they confine to the realm of subjective speculation: actual infinities. Again, mathematics is a pristine example. The foundational project described in section 5 is meant to convince that an actual infinity must be hypothesized as a generative element in mathematics in order to understand mathematics correctly.
If he convinced liberals of this truth, they would be more likely to accept the reality of transcendent infinities outside mathematics as well. The two projects follow different paths (backward analysis vs. forward synthesis), but when they are completed, the gap between liberals and illiberals will close.
In the above discourse concerning the will, self creation, and the identity of knowledge and being, we can hear the obvious echoes of German idealism. Wronski refers repeatedly in his later work to such thinkers as Fichte, Schelling, Krause, Hegel and F. Schlegel (e.g. PROL 112-177, see also d'Arcy 1970). According to Wronski, each of them has an affinity to some aspect of his own complete system, but always in a very partial or distorted way.
An interesting point of comparison here is Hegel. In his analysis of infinity in the Science of Logic,
Hegel rejected both actual infinity and Kantian indefiniteness as insufficient expressions of the concept of infinity. For Hegel, the true infinity is manifest in a contradiction which he finds expressed in (or reconstructs from what he takes as) Newton's and Lagrange's conceptions of the differential. When one considers the differential quotient as the quotient of two evanescent quantities, this differential quotient is not contained in any of the finite quotients involved in the indefinite process of approximation; nor do we ever reach a quotient of actual infinitely small quantities, because the evanescent quantities disappear when the differential quotient is "reached". It is the inherent contradiction of a ratio that is obtained only when the relata disappear -or of a ratio without relata -which is, for Hegel, the true expression of the concept of infinity.
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Wronski did not comment directly on Hegel's concept of the infinite, but he did comment on his general philosophical project. For Wronski, Hegel's work developed only one of two necessary directions: that of advancing reason beyond empirical reality towards the absolute (the "final identity" above). Since Hegel failed to identify this development of subjective reason with an already given transcendent external reality (an originary absolute), his move was fundamentally 21 See Lacroix (2000) for a continental interpretation of Hegel's notion of infinity, and Pinkard (1981) for an analytic approach; Wolff (1986) provides a thorough analysis of Hegel's understanding of mathematical entities in the context of the work of Lagrange and Cauchy, which shows some further parallels with Wronski's early work, but these parallels exceed the scope of this paper.
partial. Wronski's own mathematical approach was meant, like Hegel's, to convert "liberals" to transcendent reason, but unlike Hegel (at least as perceived by Wronski), he insisted on maintaining an identity between the absolute goal of the process and a foundational absolute reality. Indeed, Wronski wrote that his mathematical task was, among other things, to "retrieve for this sublime idea
[infinity] the creative role in mathematics" (PROD 85), whereas for Hegel the point seems to have been only to lead us via mathematics from immanent, empirical perception to an idea of the absolute.
The back-and-forth relation between the infinite and the finite was Wronski's main goal. This goal is expressed in formulas such as (1), (3) and (4-5) which link finite combinations of infinite magnitudes with indefinite combinations of finite magnitudes; this goal is expressed in the foundational role given to infinity in Wronski's system; and, finally, it is expressed in the universalizing act of will, which reaches its zenith with Wronski's "universal law": the expansion of any function as an infinite series of any sequence of functions. This supreme law implemented infinitary reasoning in order to couple any mathematical magnitude with an infinite series that could, in principle, be converted into a convergent expression (REFI 11), thus creating a reality that unifies objective experience with reason's generative capacity.
Given the privileged status of mathematics in his contemporary system of knowledge, Wronski's reform of mathematics was supposed to be metonymic of his general socio-political-philosophical reform, and convince the most serious scientists that his path were to bear fruit.
Conclusion
Wronski's project may have been noble, but he failed miserably in promoting it. There are several reasons for this failure. First, Wronski insisted on mixing philosophy and mathematics in a way that was not accessible to contemporary mathematicians. Indeed, his early mathematical work repeatedly refers to the Kantian philosophy not yet disseminated in France, while using some of its concepts without properly introducing them. Second, Wronski's work tended to have an esoteric dimension, withholding proofs from a community that was wary of unsubstantiated claims. Third, Wronski's writing style was repetitive, self congratulatory, dismissive and alienating. Finally, the intellectual scene, especially around the academy, was highly polemical, and professional discords were often overdetermined by generation, class and ideological gaps (see Ehrhardt 2010 Ehrhardt , 2011 for examples).
Wronski, as a foreigner, was on the disadvantaged end of these gaps. He often felt that his origin turned people against him, and that he was without "national protection" This paper presented one "loser's" approach to infinity. This loser promoted a transcendent notion of actual infinity, which, through acts of will, was to unite transcendent knowledge and immanent being into one absolute reality. This was not only a mathematical project, but also a political project.
For Wronski, the huge divide between transcendent and immanent reflected the political divide between liberals and illiberals; the creative act of bridging this divide was as political as it was philosophical, mathematical and religious. This conglomerate of scientific, political, philosophical and religious unification of the infinite and the finite was christened by Wronski "messianism". The project of messianism was the project of creating a new, salvific reality through rational investigation, led by the investigation of mathematics and its philosophy.
Only when Wronski's mathematical work is set in this kind of context, can we make sense of his insistence on treating infinity in a way that antagonized the very people he sought to impress and cost him his reputation and career. Following these polemics, Wronski describes a reality where students he had tutored were deliberately failed, whereas a student that he had tutored, but was examined as the student of another tutor, passed (REFII 103). This form of persecution left Wronski destitute. He was granted the opportunity of presenting a course on Kantian philosophy at the Sorbonne, but had to decline, because he was so poor he couldn't even afford proper shoes. Moreover, he reports that he could not afford to get medical help for his dying son, and that his works were sold for the weight of their paper. In 1831, Galois would write that he did not want to end up "compared with Wronski or these indefatigable men who every year find a new solution to the squaring of the circle" (Neumann 2011, 249 ).
In 1814 Wronski was introduced to Arson, a person who made a quick fortune and decided to leave 24 A list of abbreviations for works by Wronski cited in this paper is available at the end of this paper. 25 On June 10, 1811, Wronski presented to the academy his introduction to the philosophy of mathematics (INT).
Lacroix was assigned to review it, but a week later announced that it had nothing to do with the previous work, and, being based on a metaphysics that Lacroix had not studied, he could not review it.
26 On September 9, 1811, Wronski submitted the "réfutation de la Théorie des Fonction" (which would later be published in LAG). Legendre and Arago wrote a condemning report on November 11. Servois (1814), too, reacted fiercely. On may 11, 1812, Wronski submitted his "Résolutions Générales des Equations" (later appended to INT). A week later Poisson reports on it, but the report itself (which, according to LOI 32, dismissed the possibility of a solution)
is not cited.
his business ventures to pursue science and philosophy. Their relationship resulted in several mathematical publications, but also a public polemic over alleged debts that Arson refused to pay. It should be noted that while this formula subsumed not only Taylor'a formula as a special case, but also a vast number of other contemporary methods (a feat acknowledged by Lacroix and Lagrange) , it necessarily failed where term-by-term derivation did not work. This failure characterizes the most common Fourier series, which were on the rise at the time, and which Wronski almost never considered. Perhaps he meant to provide an alternative to Fourier series by his "higher trigonometric 30 The best summary of Wronski mathematics is available in Dickstein (1892-1896).
functions". These functions are sine and cosine like functions formed by choosing n-th roots of unity ρ and σ, and extracting from the series expansion of ρx e the series of those terms which are a real multiple of σ. These functions were discussed as tools for analyzing celestial mechanics, but never explicitly as an alternative to Fourier series.
Wronski explored many variations of expansions of function as series of other functions, and attempted to provide methods that would guarantee convergence (TECHI, TECHII). Of particular interest is his "supreme method". Here, having constructed the approximation a 1 Ω 1 +a 2 Ω 2 +...+a n Ω n for the function F, the function Ω n+1 is chosen so as to render zero the Wronskian determinant of F and Ω 1 , Ω 2 , …, Ω n . The point here is of course not to find the trivial solution Ω n+1 = F-a 1 Ω 1-a 2 Ω 2-...-a n Ω n , but an optimal approximate solution from within a restricted collection of functions. Such expansion would reflect, according to Wronski, not only the value of the function, but also its nature.
Wronski's next step was to solve differential equations by extending a theorem of Lagrange that Here should be noted Wronski's concern with providing exhaustive calculations of the coefficients of his various theorems and techniques, rather than leaving the practitioner to calculate them ad-hoc.
To do that at the required level of generality, Wronski devised a complex apparatus of combinatorial sums enabling him to state general recursive and closed formulas for his coefficients.
Wronski's next contribution concerns polynomial equations. His INT (111-112) includes a non construcive argument that's meant to show that all polynomial equations can be solved by applying the basic arithmetical operations to roots of the coefficients (the reasoning there was refuted in Servois 1814, 163-166 ). An appendix includes a conversion of a polynomial equation of degree n to a system of n equations in n-1 symmetric variables, which is supposed to be reducible to a single polynomial of degree n-1 in one variable (even though the degree of the previous system of equations is hyperexponential in n). The initial conversion seems plausible (based on my very cursory reading), while the subsequent reduction is false, and was refuted by Ruffini (1818) and independently by Torriani (1819) . In 1827 (CAN 59) Wronski acknowledged that the degree of his "reduced" equation may be higher than that of the original equation, but later he seems to state that his solution does work after all (REFI 24, REFII cci, cciv).
Another approach (which does work) to reducing polynomial equations is based on the above aims at reducing the range of searching for solutions, rather than actually providing them. Wronski's unproven statements here are more general than his methods can actually deliver. Hanegraeff (1860) and Bukaty (1873) provide reconstructions.
Another achievement, this time a popular mathematical artifact, was Wronski's compact logarithm tables published in 1827 (CAN). These were based on the first terms of a series expansion of the logarithm. The trick was to give, instead of the full logarithm, a simple way to pick up from a single sheet of paper two or three blocks of digits that compose the desired logarithm. These tables were studied by Bushaw (1983) , who commended their ingenuity.
Wronski also planned some computation machines, and ventured to provide an alternative probability theory, which rejected the independence of subsequent steps in a game (e.g., dice throws, roulette wheel turns, stock price increments). Instead, he claimed that subsequent steps tended to "even out": if a certain result was obtained, its chances of recurrence diminished. As odd as this may sound today, this approach in fact builds on a previous attempt by no less than d'Alembert (Daston 1979 ).
I cannot give an adequate review or evaluation of Wronski's physics (and as far as I know no such review was ever attempted). Wronski's attempted reforms covered terrestrial and celestial mechanics as well as hydrodynamics, and were applied to locomotion, the study of the shape of the earth, the study of tides, and astronomy. He dabbled with the idea of perpetum mobile, and claimed that Leverrier's discovery of Neptune could not have been made except by his methods "since there are no others" (REFIII, 6).
Villarceau (1882) wrote that Wronski's physics is not fully coherent, but does contain useful ideas.
A group of scholars (Ksawery Jankovski, Godofredo García, Paulin Chomicz and P.P. Demiańczuk)
found Wronski's physical theory relevant as late as the 1930s, and tried to build on it. Some discussion and references are available in the 1938 issue of Acta Astronomica (Ser. C, Vol 3).
